EDITORIAL by unknown
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Published monthly during the Academic Year by the Yale Law Journal'Co., Inc.
Edited by Students and members of the Faculty of the Yale School of Law.


































Canadian subscription price is $5.oo a year; foreign, $5.S a year.
If a subscriber wishes his copy of the JOURNAL discontinued at the expiration of his sub-
scription, notice to that effect should be sent; otherwise, it is assumed that a continuation
of the subscription is desired.
EXAMINATION OF JURORS PRIOR TO CHALLENGE
The right of challenging a juror for cause seems to be as old as the
jury system itself. Glanville and Bracton both speak of it,' and the
early Year Books contain many cases wherein' challenges both to the
array and- to the polls were interposed and sustained.2 At common law
no peremptory challenges were allowed in civil actions ;3 and they seem
to have been originally unknown in criminal causes,4 for neither Glan-
'Glanville, A Treaties on the Laws and Customs of the Kingdom of England
(Beame's transl. 1912, Legal Classics Series) 50; Bracton, De Legibus Angliae
(118o-in9o) ff. 143, 185, (Twiss' transl. 1879, 188o) Vol, 2, p. 453, Vol. 3, PP.
183-187.
' See e. g. Triple v. Hakeney (1343) Y. B. 17 Edw. III (Pikes's transl. 1903) 88;
Anonymolts (I344)' Y. B. 18 Edw. III (Pike's transl. 19o5) 256-26o; Anonymous
(1345) Y. B. 19 Edw. III (Pike's transl. x9o6) 146. See also Atte Wode v.
Clifford (1402-3) reported in Select Cases before the King's Council (Selden
Society Publications, vol. 35, 1918) 86.
'Gordon v. Chicago (1903) 2oI Ill. 623, 626, 66 N. E. 823, 824; Sackett v. Ruder
(18go) 152 Mass. 397, 400, 25 N. E. 736, 738.
I2 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law (2d ed. 1899) 621, n. 5; 1
Stephen, History of Criminal Law (1883) 301. The statute (1305) 33 Edw. I. St.
[514]
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ville nor Bracton nor Britton mentions them. But by the time of
Fortescue, who was Chief justice of England during a part of the reign
of Henry VI, the accused in a capital case had acquired the right of
striking thirty-five jurors "peremptorily without assigning any cause
for such challenge; and no exceptions are to be taken against such his
challenge." 5  At present peremptory challenges in both civil and crimi-
nal cases are usually provided for by statute.
In the early cases it was not uncommon for the judge to examine
jurors as to their qualifications, even in the absence of challenge, where
he had reason to doubt their impartiality." When the jurors came from
the same small community as the parties and answered inquiries as of
their own knowledge or even upon their consciences, 7 the problem for
the litigant of securing adequate information for the intelligent exercise
of his challenges was very simple of solution. There was very little, if
any, need for a preliminary examination of the jurors. And it seems
to have been the custom to permit such examination only after challenge
and only with reference to the particular grounds of disqualification
alleged."- But as society grew more complex and the jury system devel-
oped, the jurors ceased to be drawn from among the neighbors and close
acquaintances of the parties, and the functions of the jury were trans-
formed from those of witnesses to those of triers of fact upon evidence
produced before them in open court. Under such circumstances any
preliminary extra-judicial investigation, sufficiently thorough to yield
trustworthy information to be used in framing challenges for cause or
in exercising peremptory challenges, must be both difficult and expen-
sive. It is not surprising, therefore, to find counsel endeavoring to get
the information by means of an examination of the jurors on voir dire
prior to challenge. The English judges emphatically discountenanced
this attempted innovation upon settled practice. That it had never been
done was an entirely adequate reason why it should never be done.9 In
4 seems to indicate that prior thereto the crown might challenge peremptorily
without limit.
'Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliae (Amos's ed. of the transl. of 1775,
1825) 92.
6 Bracton, op. cit. f. 143 (Twiss' transl. op. cit. vol. 2, p. 453); Ano,,ynwlus
(339) Y. B. 13 Edw. III (Pike's transl.) 286.
"In folio 185 Bracton, speaking of the jury in the assise of novel disseisin says:
"But if even thus the truth cannot be known, then it will be requisite to speak from
belief and conscience at least." Bracton op. cit. f. 185 (Twiss' transl. vol. 3,
p. 195).
8 This is to be gathered not only from the later practice, but also from such
passages as that found in Bracton, folio 85, translated thus by Twiss: "Because a
present cause ought to be alleged and proved, but not a past cause, etc." See also
the form of challenge given in Chapter 34 of the Mirror of Justices (1285-1290?)
Sejden Soceity Publications (1893) vol. 7, P. 116. But if upon an examination on
a challenge for one cause, another cause appeared, it seems to have been considered
by the court. See Triple v. Hakenwy, mtpra note 2.
Queen v. Stewart (1845, Q. B.) i Cox C. C. 174, Jones, Serjt., attempted to
'9
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some American courts it crept in unawares. When brought to the
attention of the judges, they hastened to comment on its heterodoxy and
to warn counsel that it must not be considered legitimate procedure.
10
Counsel seem not to have heeded this warning, for the ancient practice
disallowing a preliminary examination now persists in only a minority of
jurisdictions,"- and in these it is sought to support it upon reason. It
is said that, if such an examination without challenge is permitted, the
court (i) will have no control over it, (2) cannot draw the line between
proper and improper questions, (3) cainnot protect the juror from
improper questions, (4) cannot compel the juror to answer proper
questions, and (5) cannot detect false excuses of those desiring to
escape jury duty: such an examination (6) will be offensive to the
juror, and (7) will cause unseemly, vexatious, and expensive delays.
It must be obvious that the first five assertions assume an almost incom-
prehensible impotence in the trial court. They entirely disregard the
fact that such examination, when allowed, is not an extra-judicial, but a
judicial, proceeding, and is as much under the control of the court as
any other part of the trial. The offence to the juror can be no greater,
put a question to each juryman as he came into the box, and the prosecution
objected. "Alderson, B.--'It is quite a new course to catechise a jury in this way.'
"Jones, Serjt.-'I have a right, my lord, to challenge, and I submit that I Am
entitled to ask for information that is necessary to enable me effectively to
exercise that right. At all events, your lordship will perhaps intimate to the jury,
thA such of them as are members of this association had better retire from the
box.'
"Alderson, B--'I cannot allow you to cross-examine the jury, nor will I intimate
to them anything on the subject you mention.- If you like to challenge absolutely,
you may do so.'"
Reg. v. Dowling (1848) 3 Cox C. C. 509. Here, too, counsel asked the privi-
lege of examining a juror for the purpose of eliciting information on which to base
a challenge, admitting that he'had no information concerning him. Erle, J.,
responded: "Then I must refuse your application, unless, indeed, you can quote
some authority on the subject. I think it a very unreasonable thing that a juryman
should be cross-examined without your having received any information respecting
him."
1 Negro Matilda v. Mason & Moore (1822, C. C. D. C.) 2, Cranch C. C. 343.
An examination without challenge was allowed, but the court said: "This case
must not be drawn into precedent as the court did not mean to sanction such a
practice." State'%. Zellers (1824) 7 N. J. L. 22o. The Chief Justice refused to
allow counsel to ask a juror if he had not made up and expressed an opinion:
"Wall: 'Do we understand it to be the opinion of the court that we cannot inter-
rogate the juror as to his having formed an opinion ;-it has been repeatedly done.'
"Kirkpatrick, C. J.: 'It is true we have slipped into the practice, but on looking
into it I am satisfied it is not the true way: the only proper way is, to make the
challenge, and then prove it upon oath."'
'Bales v. State (1879) 63 Ala. 30; People v. Hamilton (1882) 62 Calif. 377;
People v. Trask (1907) 7 Calif. App. 1o3, 93 Pac. 891; Crew v. State (igoi) 113
Ga. 645, 38 S. E. 941; Clifford v. State (1898) 6i N. J. L. 217, 39 Ati. 721; State
v. Palmieri (1919) 93 N. J. L. 195, io7 At. 4o7. But the rule is changed by
statute in civil cases in New Jersey. N. J. Pub. Laws, 1911, ch. 151.
COMMENTS
and, indeed, will usually be much less, than when preceded by a
challenge. As to the delay-in so far as expenditure of time is required
to secure an impartial jury, it is entirely justified: in so far as it is made
by counsel for improper purposes, the trial court has the remedy at its
hand. " It is not to be assumed that trial judges will be so shiftless or
pusillanimous as to permit counsel to indulge with impunity in miscon-
duct in this or any other part of the trial. The privilege bf examining
jurors for the purpose of ascertaining the existence of grounds of
challenge for cause or of securing data for the intelligent exercise of
peremptory challenges is not a privilege to engage ini irrelevant and
immaterial conversations with prospective jurors without control or
supervision by the court.
On the other hand the majority of courts recognize that to deny
opportunity for such an examination is greatly to decrease, if not to
destroy, the value of the right of challenge.1 2  The actual practice
' Eytinge v. Territory (iog) 12 Ariz. 131, IOO Pac. 443; Union Pacific Ry. v.
Jones (I895) 21 Colo. 340, 40 Pac. 8!i;" Jones v. People (1896) 23 Colo. 276, 47
Pac. 275; Donovan v. People (189i) 139 Ill. 412, 28 N. E. 964; Baker v. State
(192i, Ind.) 129 N. E. 468; State v. Dooley (1894) 89 Iowa, 584, 57 N. W. 414;
Stone v. Monticello Co. (i9o9) 135 Ky. 659, 17 S. W. 369; Hale v. State (1894)
72 -Miss. 14o, 16 So. 387; State v. Mann (884) 83 Mo. 589; State v. Brooks
(1920) 57 Mont. 480, 188 Pac. 942; Basye v. State (1895) 45 Neb. 261, 63 N. W.
811; State v. Douthitt (19i2i, N. M.) 194 Pac. 879; Dresch v. Elliott (igio) 137
App. Div. 252, 122 N. Y. Supp. i4; State v. Ellis (1918) 98 Ohio St 21, 12o N. E.
218; Temple v. State (9I8) 15 Okla. Cr. 176, 175 Pac. 733; State v. Steeves
(1896) 29 Or. 85, 43 Pac. 947; Comfort v. Masser (I888) 121 Pa. 455, 15 Atl.
612; Houston & Texas Ry. v. Terrell (1888) 69 Tex. 650, 7 S. W. 670; State v.
Thompson (1902) 24 Utah, 314, 67 Pac. 789; Fowlies Adm'Wx. v. McDonald (ipo)
85 Vt 438, 82 Atl. 677; Hoyt v. Indep't. Co. (1909) 52 Wash. 672, 101 Pac. 367;
Carpenter v. Hyman (igio) 67 W. Va. 4, 66 S. E. 1O78. All of these cases
exhibit the practice of permitting examination prior to challenge, though some of
them are not direct decisions that such examination is a matter of right In some
jurisdictions, it is said that the statute authorizing peremptory challenges neces-
sarily implies the right of preliminary examination. In some states such right is
expressly conferred by statute. In an early North Carolina case it was said: "A
party has no right to examine a juror or any other person by way of fishing for
some ground of exception." State v. Creasman (1849, N. C.) IO Ired. 395. The
result was that in order to secure an examination, it was necessary to challenge;
and the opposing party might admit the challenge, and thus eliminate a perfectly
qualified juror whom the challenger, if the facts were known, might desire to
retain. This led to the passage of Laws, 1913, ch. 31, sec. 6, which confers the
right of examination prior to challenge. See State v. Christy (1916) 17o N. C.
772, 87 S. E. 499. Minn. Rev. Laws, 1905, sec. 5386 also confers such right
Prior thereto the matter rested entirely within the discretion of the trial court.
State v. Smith (1894) 56 Minn. 78, 57 N. W. 325. In Connecticut the statute
gives such right in civil actions. Zalewski v. Waterbury Co. (1914) 89 Conn. 46,
92 Atl. 682; in criminal causes the matter rests in the discretion of the trial court
and its ruling will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing of abuse of discre-
tion. State v. Lee (1897) 69 Conn. 186, 37 Atl. 75. See also the New Jersey
statute, supra note II.
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varies. In some jurisdictions the court makes a preliminary examina-
tion and then puts further questions upon the suggestion of counsel ;13
in others, the court, after the preliminary examination, turns the jurors
over to counsel for further questioning;14 in still others the entire
examination is conducted by counsel. 1 5  In all the scope of the examina-
tion is not unlimited, merely because there is no precise issue made by
a challenge and its denial. Any question which calls for facts that will
enable counsel to determine the advisability of challenging for cause or
peremptorily is proper; but the examination is conducted under the
supervision of the trial judge, and his ruling upon the propriety of a
particular question will not be reversed except for abuse of discretion.1
6
There is, therefore, no reason for the unseemly spectacle, 'occasionally
witnessed, of a court permitting counsel to waste days and weeks in
irrelevant and useless inquiries addressed to prospective jurors. The
remedy for such disgraceful proceedings is not a reversion to an out-
grown procedure which makes the right of challenge of slight value but
the installation of trial judges with the character and energy to exercise
their discretion sanely and courageously.
E. M. M.
SEARCH, SEIZURE, AND THE FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS
In the light of a number of recent decisions of the Federal Supreme
Court, it seems safe to assert that the cherished rights of the people to
security in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreason-
able searches and seizures, as vouchsafed them by the Fourth Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution, are in no immediate danger of disso-
lution. Every man's home is still his castle; and this fundamental
doctrine of personal freedom, fought for and achieved by the valiant
Wilkes, over a century and a half ago in England,' still flourishes with a
sturdy vigor. Its renewed vindication by the courts has been partly
occasioned by activities of various over-zealous federal agents in the
enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment.
The use of the search warrant for the apprehension of stolen goods
was exercised in England from the earliest times.2  It is to the abuse
" See e. g. Williams v. State (1921, Miss.) 87 So. 273; Funches v. State (1921,
Miss.) 87 So. 487.
' See e. g. State v. Ellis, supra note 12.
15 This is the-practice in most of the cases cited in note 12 supra.
Union Pacific Ry. v. Jones, supra note 12; Martin v. Lilly (igig) 188
Ind. 139, 121 N. E. 443; National Bank v. Romine (1911) 154 Mo. App. 624, 136
S. W. 21; Strong v. State (1921, Neb.) 183 N. W. 559; State v. Ellis, supra
note 12; State v. Turley (1913) 87 Vt. 163, 88 At. 562; Carpenter v. Hy nan,
supra note 12. The same doctrine is indicated in most of the cases cited in note 12
supra.
'Wilkes Case (1763, C. P.) i9 How. St. Tr. 982. See Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, (7th ed. 1903) 426, note.
'Blackstone, Commentaries, *290.
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of this necessary governmental power, rather than to its proper legal
use, that the Fourth Amendment owes its existence. "General
warrants" in England, for the hounding of seditious publications, and
"writs of assistance" in this country, for the apprehension of smuggled
goods, placed, as John Adams said, "the liberty of every man in the
bands of every petty officer."'3  It was these broadside writs that the
framers of our Constitution had in mind when they so effectually
provided against their recurrence.
The Fourth Amendment not only forbids "unreasonable searches and
seizures" but also sets forth the requisites of a lawful search.4 The
protection thus guaranteed embodies an old common-law principle, and
the tendency of the courts has been to favor the individual. Although
it is a federal limitation only and does not affect the states,- it has been
included by all the states in their constitutions or bills of rights.6
It has always been well settled that search warrants are confined to
criminal actions and cannot be used for private ends ;7 nor can they be
issued until a "probable cause" has been duly determined to exist.
There must be such a state of facts as would lead a reasonable man to
believe that a crime has been committed.8 The specific evidential facts
constituting probable cause must be asserted under oath to exist. A
mere affidavit that the affiant has "good reason to believe" that named
persons on certain premises were possessed of and unlawfully sold
liquor is insufficient." The propriety of issuing a search warrant is to
be determined by the facts, not by rumor, suspicion or guess-work."'1
Sufficient facts having been sworn to, there must be a warrant issued
to legalize the search. Recent decisions show a tendency on the part
of the courts to regard a warrant as essential, even where permission to
'2 Bancroft, History of the United States (i8go) 546-548.
'"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized."
'Adams v. New York (1904) 192 U. S. 585, 24 Sup. Ct 372; Burdeau v.
McDowell (1921) 41 Sup. Ct 574; Johnson v. State (1921, Ga.) lO9 S. E. 662.
'Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures (1921) 34 HARv. L. REv. 361.
'State v. Schmuck (1908) 77 Ohio St 438, 83 N. E. 797; United States v.
Maresca (192o, S. D. N. Y.) 266 Fed. 713.
'The mere statement of a person under the influence of liquor as to its place
of procurement appears not to be probable cause, even though the statement is
shown by the search to be true. People v. De Vasto (1921, Sup. Ct) 19o N. Y.
Supp. 816. It is entirely possible that the compliance with the technical rules of
search warrant, so strictly enforced by the courts in such cases as this, would not
be subjected to such close scrutiny if the case involved seditious acts rather than
an infraction of the liquor laws,--an unfortunate commentary on the times.
United States v. Ray & Schultz (1921, E. D. Mich.) 275 Fed. 1004.
10 United States v. Kelih (1921, S. D. Ill.) 272 Fed. 484; see also Cooley, -op. cit.
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search has been given by the occupants of the premises, because such
permission may be due to coercion." An alleged waiver of this consti-
tutional protection must be shown by clear and positive testimony.
Mere acquiescence is no waiver.'" As to whether such a search by
consent would have been regarded as unreasonable by those who framed
our Constitution may be problematical; but such decisions clearly
evidence the liberal tendencies of the courts. The warrant must be
issued by an officer having jurisdiction of the search,'3 before such
search, 14 and cannot be subsequently altered to fit the circumstances by
the searching officers, even though with the consent of the issuing
officer.'"
The purpose for which it is issued must be "reasonable."' 6  That is,
search warrants may be issued for the recovery of stolen property, for
the apprehension of articles used in the commission of a felony, or to
terminate a possession that is itself illegal; but property of mere eviden-
tiary value may not be seized, even with a search warrant.'
7
The warrant must contain a particular description of the place to be
searched. A description of an apartment building, when the place
searched was only one of the apartments in such building, has been held
too general, and the warrant vacated.' 8 The thing to be seized must
also be described, seizure of a different kind of property than that speci-
fied being a trespass.' 9
The practical unanimity which the courts have exhibited in enforcing
rights against search and seizure has not been displayed in determining
the admissibility of evidence secured by an illegal seizure. In the case
of Boyd v. United States,20 Mr. Justice Bradley asserted that the intro-
' Dukes v. United States (1921, C. C. A. 4th) 275 Fed. 142.
" United States v. Lydecker (1921, W. D. N. Y.) 275 Fed. 976; United States
v. KelIh, supra note IO; Amos v. United States (1921) 225 U. S. 313, 41 Sup. Ct.
266; but see Bruner v. Comnmonwealth (1921, Ky.) 233 S. W. 795; McClurg v.
Brenton (1904) 123 Iowa, 368, 98 N. W. 881; Smith v. McDuffee (1914) 72 Or.
276, 143 Pac. 929.
"People v. 738 Bottles of Intoxicating Liquor (1921, Co. Ct.) 116 Misc. 252,
19o N. Y. Supp. 477.
" New York v. One Hudson Cabriolet (1921, Co. C) 116 Misc. 399, 19o N. Y.
Supp. 481.
"United States v. Mitchell (1921, N. D. Calif.) 274 Fed. 128.
81n Gouled v. United States (1921) 255 U. S. 298, 309, 41 Sup. Ct. 261, 265, the
court, speaking through Mr. Justice Clarke, held that search warrants "may be
resorted to only when a primary right to such search and seizure may be found
in the interest which the public or the, complainant may have in the property to be
seized, or in the right to possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police
power renders possession of the property by the accused unlawful, and provides
that it may be taken." See (1921) 30 YALE LAw JOuRNAL, 769,
"Gouled v. United States supra, note 16.
United States v. Mitchell supra, note 15.
"State v. Slamon (190l) 73 Vt. 212, 50 Atl. 1097; but see Bruner v. Common-
wealth, supra note 12.
0 (1885) 116 U. S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524.
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duction of evidence secured by search and seizure is in effect a violation
of that part of the Fifth Amendment which provides against compul-
sory self-incrimination.2 1  Basing this dictum cft a previous dictum of
Lord Camden, 22 he held the evidence inadmissible. 23  On the other hand,
there is a well-settled rule of procedure to the effect that the court,
largely to avoid a collateral issue, will receive any competent evidence
without inquiry into the means by which it was procured.2 4  Following
this general rule, the United States Supreme Court changed its position
in the case of Adams v. New York,2s and there first enunciated the rule
that evidence, even though obtained by illegal search and seizure, is
admissible. Ten years later the same court weakened the rule, and held
that the defendant, by a seasonable demand before trial, could require
the return of articles seized as evidence, and that use thereof, after such
demand was in effect compulsory self-incrimination.2 Following this,
the case of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States27 held that the
government could not utilize information secured by an illegal search;
and in the recent Gouled case28 the "seasonable demand" rule Was held
inapplicable when the defendant had no knowledge of the adverse
possession of the evidence until its production in court.29  The "season-
able demand" rule has been rendered practically innocuous by two more
' "Nor shall (any person) be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself."
'"It is very certain that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself; because
the necessary means of compelling self accusation, falling upon the innocent as
well as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust; and it would seem, that search
for evidence is disallowed upon the same principle. Then, too, the innocent would
be confounded with the guilty." Entick v. Carrington & Three Other Kings
Messengers (765, C. P.) ig How. St. Tr. 1029, 1073.
"They (the Fourth and Fifth Amendments) throw great light on each other.
For the 'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the Fourth Amend-
ment, are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give
evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth
Amendment; and compelling a man 'in a criminal case to be a witness against
himself,' which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question
as to what is an 'unreasonable search and seizure' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment And we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a
man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially
different from compelling him to be a witness against himself." Boyd v. United
States, sipra note 2o, at'p. 633, 6 Sup. Ct. at p. 534.
"4Benson v. State (1921, Ark.) 233 S. W. 758; Johnson v. State (1922, Ga.)
O9 S. E. 662; 4 Wigmore, Evidence (905) sec. 2x83; see also State v. Turner
(igio) 82 Kan. 787, IO9 Pac. 654; 136 Am. St. Rep. 129, 135, note.
(1904) 192 U. S. 585, 24 Sup. Ct 372.
26 Weeks v. United States (I914) 232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341.
(920) 252 U. S. 385, 40 Sup. Ct 182.
Gouled v. United States, su-Pra note 16.
Mr. Justice Clarke in his opinion in that case, at p. 312, said, "Where in the
progress of a trial it becomes probable that there has been an unconstitutional
seizure of papers, it is the duty of the trial court to entertain an object to their
admission."
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recent cases, one of which allowed a demand after the jury was sworn,30
and the other allowed an objection just prior to the final charge to the
jury.3 1 This line of cases clearly indicates a short lease of life for the
battered remnant of the original rule that a demand is essential to bring
the evidence within the Fifth Amendment.
It is submitted that the supposed relation and inter-dependence
of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments is fundamentally unsound, and
that the rule originating therein, that a search warrant will not issue for
matter of mere evidentiary value, likewise has no valid basis in history,
justice, or policy. One amendment preserves the inviolability of the
person and the home, the other protects the innocent from inquisition;
and it seems reasonable to believe that the framers of the Constitution
contemplated no duplication. If the Fifth Amendment actually applied
to private papers illegally procured and used in evidence over objection,
the question of who procured the evidence would clearly be immaterial,
and would in no way affect the compulsory nature of the so-called self-
incrimination. But the federal courts have no hesitancy in admitting
such evidence when procured by one not connected with the federal
government.3?2 The distinction is illogical if the application of the
Fifth Amendment is sound; but the inconsistency of the court in this
matter is further evidence of the unsoundness of such application. The
gradual disintegration of the "seasonable demand" rule, which lent
color to the claim of privilege, brings us to the astonishing situation that
although the government knows as a fact the existence of damning
documents in the possession of the defendant, if such documents are
merely evidential in nature they cannot be reached either by a subpoena
duces tecum 33 or by a search warrant regularly issued. This is surely
"justice tampered with mercy."
'3 4
CERTIFYING ALTERED CHECKS UNDER THE NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAW*
When a drawee bank certifies a check which has fallen into dishonest
hands and been materially altered before the certification, what is the
,o Amos v. United States, supra note 12.
n Holmes v. United States (1921, C. C. A. 4th) 275 Fed. 49.
3 In Burdean v. McDowell (1921) 41 Sup. Ct. 574, 576, the court said: "We see
no reason why the fact that individuals unconnected with the government may
have wrongfully taken them (the papers) should prevent them from being held
for use in prosecuting an offense, where the documents are of an incriminatory
character." In the same case it was pointed out that mere retention of papers so
obtained does not constitute search and seizure. See (922) 3f YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 335.
WThe defendant, in supplying evidence under such a subpoena, is regarded as
coming within the constitutional protection, because he does in fact by his own act
incriminate himself.
244 Wigmore, Evidence (19o5) sec. 2251.
* [This comment was received after the decision involved had been considered
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bank's obligation? Dean Ames, with characteristic perception, foresaw
a different answer to this question under the Negotiable Instruments
Law from that which had been given before' and he foresaw correctly.
At common law an acceptor was bound to know the signature of a
drawer and the state of his account ;2 that is, he was liable on an accep-
tance whether he owed the drawer or not and whether the drawer's
signature was genuine or not,--for who better than the drawee should
know these things ?3 Correspondingly, if he had paid an overdraft4 or
a bill to which the drawer's signature was forged5 he could not recover
in the form of a recent case note. Inasmuch as the writer of the note reached a
different conclusion from the authors of the comment and in view of the impor-
tance of the subject to the commercial world, it has been deemed advisable to
publish the note as well as this comment The note will be found infra, at
p. 548.-Ed.]
1 The Doctrite of Price v. Neal (189) 4 HARv. L. REv. 297, 306-3o7.
'Espy v. Bank of Cincinnati (1873, U. S.) 18 Wall. 6o4, 61g. No attempt
is made in this comment to draw or show distinctions between checks and other
bills of exchange with regard to the questions at issue. Whatever legal distinc-
tions may conceivably have existed in the matter before the N. I. L. have now
lost their reason for existence; the cases in the main treat the question without
reference to any such distinction; and the considerations of policy seem identical.
It should be further stated that no attempt is made to exhaust the common-law
authorities.
'The reason assigned is somewhat superficial on the matter of signature for it
has been pointed out many times that signatures vary so much on different writings
as to be incapable of certain identification. Nevertheless the burden is where it
should be,-on the drawee. The rule is applied with some consistency, for payment
by a drawee's branch under mistake as to either the signature or state of account
is recoverable. Woodland v. Fear (857, Q. B.) 7 El. & BI. 519 (state of
account); Canadian Exp. Co. v. Home Bank of Canada (19o9, Divis. Ct.) 14
Ont W. R. 287 (moriey order: forged signature of drawing agent of express
company). Another reason for binding drawees has been given, i. e. that the
business world must needs have commercial transactions brought to a conclusion
at some certain time and place. See note 24 infra. But under the old law this
reason proved too much for it applies with equal force to faults in bills other than
those just discussed.
'Citifens' Bank v. S chwaraschild & Sultzberger Co. (19o9) 109 Va. 539, 64
S. E. 954 (N. I. L. in force but decided upon common-law authority). See also
Nat. Bank of N. I. v. Berrall (10o4) 7o N. J. L. 757, 58 Atl. 189 (same rule
although stop payment order had been given).
5Price v. Neal (1726, K. B.) 3 Burr. 1354, the doctrine of which seems to be
generally established throughout common-law domain. 3 Eng. & Emp. Digest, tit
Bankers and Banking, p. 231, footnote (Canada, Scotland, Ireland, and India cited
in apparent accord) ; Com'l & Farmers' Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank (1868)
30 Md. ii. The rule is apparently applied where both the drawer's signature and
the payee's indorsement are forged. First National Bank of Marshalltowv v.
Marsalltovn; State Bank (1899) I7 Iowa, 327, 77 N. W. 1045; State Bank v.
Cunmberland Savings & Tr. Co. (1915) 168 N. C. 605, 85 S. E. 5. (N. I. L. in
force but not depended upon.) The assumption in such double forgery cases
probably and reasonably is that the two signatures were forged by the same
person. See, apparently contra however, on double forgeries People's Bank v.
Franklin Bank (1889) 88 Tenn. 299, 12 S. W. 716; Farmers' Nat. Bank v.
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the money so paid-a sound enough rule, for, as has been often pointed
out, there is in general little reason to put actual payment and agreement
to pay on different footing. On the other hand, recovery was permitted
to the drawee who had paid when the bill had been tampered with or
bore a forged indorsement.6 And, similarly, the drawee was not liable
on his acceptance7 (at least not for the excess) on a raised bill;8 nor
where the hill had been otherwise materially altered-as by- a change of
the payee's name ;9 nor where the indorsement has been forged' 0-- even
the indorsement of the very drawer whose drawing signature he must
recognize at his peril."1
Of course, there is rno pretending that all the decisions can be grouped
harmoniously around so simple a framework as that preceding, espe-
cially since the holder's rights against acceptors or his defences against
claims of drawees who had paid by mistake depended in part upon his
relation to the instrument,-whether, for instance, he was a holder for
Farmers' & Traders' Bank (1914) 159 Ky. 141, 166 S. W. 986. For the minority
view repudiating or modifying the doctrine of Price v. Neal see notes 13 and 14
infra. The cases are collected in a series of notes: IO L. R. A. (N. s.) 49; 29
ibid. IoO; L. R. A. 191.5 A, 77; .5 A. L. R. 1566. In 12 A. L. R. io89 a heroic
but ineffectual attempt is made to sum up the law on the subject harmoniously.
'Citizens' Nat. Bank v. City Nat. Bank of Clinton (igoo) iii Iowa, 211, 82
N. W. 464; L. R. A. 1916 E, 539, note.
'We are dealing here with persons taking or relying on the paper after the
tampering. There is always the possibility that an acceptance or certification, for
instance of a bill held under a forged indorsement, will be ratified by the true
owner as obligee and thereby render the acceptor or certifier liable. Cf. Anglo-
South American Bank v. Nat. City Bank (1914) 161 App. Div. 268, 146 N. Y.
Supp. 457.
'Espy v. Bank of Cincinnati, supra note 2; see also note'9 infra.
'Parke v. Roser. (1879) 67 Ind. 500 (check raised before certification) ; Marine
Nat. Bank v. Nat. City Bank of New York (1874) 59 N. Y. 67; Clews v. Bank
of New York (1882) 8g N. Y. "418 (date, amount, and payee's name altered
before certification); Metropolitan Nat. Bank v. Merchants' Nat. Bank (1899)
182 Ill. 367, 55 N. Et 36o (bank draft raised before certification); contra,
Louisana Nat. Bank of New Orleans v. Citizens' Bank (1876) 28 La. Ann. i89
(check raised before certification upon which holder for value relied and was
protected. Quare: was he entitled to rely as to alterations? Perhaps this case
unintentionally reflects the civil law). The effect in this connection of alteration
before acceptance of the date, number, place of payment, etc. of a bill is a nice
question; perhaps it would depend on whether the alteration operated to the accep-
tor's prejudice.
."Depan v. Browne (1824, S. C. Const. Ct.) Harper, 251, 258; Taney, C. 3.,
in Hortsman v. Henshaw (1850, U. S.) ii How. 177, 182. The rule applies
certainly unless the drawer's signature also is forged; as to which in case of
payment, see note 5 supra.
Williams v. Drexel (1859) 14 Md. 566, 568, where the drawer's drawing signa-
ture was admittedly genuine but his indorsement as payee alleged to be forged;
otherwise where the drawing signature and the indorsement of the same person as
payee are both forged. United States v. Chase National Bank (1920) 252 U. S.
485, 40 Sup. Ct. 36.
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value,-which it seems he must be."2 Some states even permitted (and
permit) the revocation of an acceptance-at least as regards certifica-
tion of a check-when the state of the drawer's account was misappre-
hended,"3 or even the recovery of the payment made over a forged
drawing,14 if the accepted instrument had not passed to a holder for
value who relied on the acceptance, or, in case of payment, if the holder
had not changed his position in reliance thereon.
But such individual variations only serve to emphasize the fact that
the common-law rule of Price v. Neal 5 was limited strictly to commit-
ting the drawee by his acceptance-or payment-to nothing beyond the
drawer's signature and the amount actually drawn.
Into this settled state of the common law then was cast Section 62 of
the Negotiable Instruments Law, destined curiously enough to lie little
noticed for twenty-five years before its recent and sudden emergence
into judicial decision startled the banker and his lawyer. The section
binds an acceptor to pay "according to the tenor of his acceptance."'"
" See io L. R. A. (N. s.) 49, 5I, note.
"Security Sawings & Trust Co. v. King (1914) 69 Or. 228, 138 Pac. 465; see
Cardozo, J., in Carnegie Trust Co. v. First Nat. Bank (915) 213 N. Y. 301, 107
N. E. 693. This peculiar rule, which seems to relate only to certification, and not
to acceptance of bills generally, has all the marks of a legal fossil, a relic in a
new age of the historical origin of certification in a bank's representation that a
check was "good," persisting deviously despite the general recognition to-day of
certification, so far as concerns the obligation of the bank, as "equivalent to an
acceptance." N. I. L. sec. 187. It is worth note that Justice Cardozo's dictum
rests on two cases both involving the form of order presented by notes payable at
a bank and certified at maturity.
"First Nat. Bank of Lisbon v. Bank of Wyndmere (19o6) 15 N. D. 299, 1O8
N. W. 546; a similar rule prevailed in Oklahoma and Washington. American
Exp. Co. v. State Nat. Bank (1911) 27 Okla. 824, 113 Pac. 711; Canadian Bank
v. Bingha (1907) 46 Wash. 657, 91 Pac. 185. On the whole subject see the notes
cited supra, note 5. It is difficult to see how the rule can persist under the N. I. L.
See 12 A. L. R. 1114, note. But in Pennsylvania, where'the rule rests on an old
statute of 1849, that statute has been held not repealed by the N. I. L. Union Nat.
Bank v. Franklin Nat. Bank. (1915) 249 Pa. 375, 94 Atl. 1o85; see also on this
point (1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 296.
(1762, K. B.) 3 Burr. 1354.
"Sec. 62. Liability of Acceptor. "The acceptor by accepting the instrument
engages that he will pay it according to the tenor of his acceptance; and admits,--
I. The existence of the drawer, the genuineness of his signature, and his capac-
ity and authority to draw the instrument, and
2. The existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse."
Section 132 states: "The acceptance of a bill is the signification by the drawee
of his assent to the order of the drawer." It is submitted that there is here no true
inconsistency. The definition applies to the normal case, where the acceptance and
the order coincide in terms. But section 62 obviously enlarges the acceptor's
obligation beyond the terms of section 132: take the case where the apparent order
of the drawer is a forgery.
Section 54 of The Bills of Exchange Act (both English and Canadian) covers
the same ground, but makes the admissions conclusive, apparently limits them
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In the case of the National City Bank of Chicago v. National Bank of
the Republic (192) 300 Ill. 103, 132 N. E. 832, the plaintiff certified a
bank draft drawn on itself which had been stolen from the mails in
course of transmission from a St. Louis debtor to his Pittsburgh creditor,
the payee, and had been altered by changing the payee's name. Relying
upon the certification,-a jeweler delivered goods to the thief, who had
filled in his own name as payee, and later collected the paper through his
bank, the defendant. When the facts were discovered, the plaintiff
sued to recover the amount of the check from the defendant bank. The
court-departing consciously from the common-law rule recognized in
Illinois as elsewhere, and doing so on the ground that the N. I. L.
intended just that change-held that the acceptor had been bound by
his acceptance, and having paid, could not recover.' 7 His contract was
to a holder in due course, and expressly excepts from the admission the genuineness
or validity of the payee's indorsement. Brannan, Negotiable Itstruments Law
(3d ed. 1919) 224; Maclaren, Bills, Notes, and Cheques (5th ed. 1916) 327;
Falconbridge, Banking and Bills of Exchange (2d ed. 1913) 692. Under the
B. E. A. the problem of raised bills would thus seem to be on a footing with the
problem under the N. I. L.; whereas the problem of altered payee becomes perhaps
a closer question. Certification of checks is not provided for by the B. E. A.;
the inference may be that the practice does not exist in England. B. E. A. sec.
73 makes general rules on demand bills applicable to checks; sec. 6o makes valid
payment of a check by a bank in good faith and ordinary course of business,
though over a forged indorsement.
'As a makeweight the court also wrenched the provision that the acceptor
admits "the existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse" into an
admission of the then payee's capacity and right to indorse (power to pass title by
indorsement). This is clearly error. That "capacity" in the section has no such
general meaning could not be better shown than by comparing the first sub-section
declaring both "capacity and authority" to be admitted as to the drawer with the
second sub-section, wherein only "the capacity" of a payee is admitted. Cf.
Smith v. Marsack (1848, C. P.) 6 C. B. 484 (acceptor precluded from showing
payee a lunatic). Dolle, in his recent elementary handbook, Business Paper
(1921) 112, falls into similar error.
Since the true reliance of the court is upon the introductory part of sec. 62 the
words "according to the tenor of his acceptance"-the decision will certainly be
exposed to attack along the following line: If the introductory words carry such
tremendous meaning as is here asserted for them, what is the purpose or effect of
the two carefully worded sub-sections stating particular things an acceptor admits?
The answer is that, first: these particular admissions are by the language and
punctuation itself stated to be additional (; and admits). Second: the particular
admissions added do in part prove additional by actually extending even the "tenor
of his acceptance" clause: even that clause does not, for instance, fairly include
an admission of the personal capacity of the payee to make a transfer which is
neither void nor voidable. If the sub-sections in part expand the language which
precedes them, they can hardly be treated as pure construction of that language.
Third, even assuming the sub-sections to construe the introductory language, the
admission of "the drawer's . . . .authority to draw the instruinent" refers back
by any fair construction to "his acceptance": "the instrument, as accepted by
him." What other form of instrument does he see, that he may admit its terms?
That the admission provided for covers something beyond what the purported
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to pay the instrument as it read when he accepted it-forged, altered or
whatnot-that was the "tenor of his acceptance." The court treated
the certification in this respect flatly as an acceptance-a wise approach,
from the commercial viewpoint, and a sound one, from the legal.
1 8
At least one other case has arisen to present the problem squarely,
National Reserve Bank v. Corn Exchange Bank,'
19 where the plaintiff
had certified a raised check which the defendant afterwards acquired
for value and collected. But while the issue was fairly enough in the
case, it was neither perceived nor decided, the court citing only the less
applicable sections of the N. I. L., and therefore reaching, as would be
expected on the common law, a decision for the acceptor. A curious
feature is that while the language of the act is equally applicable to both
cases, the policy in favor of obligating the certifying bank is overwhelm-
ingly stronger in this latter case in which that language was over-
looked. Whether or not takers of paper after certification rely in
practice on the certification as identifying the payee named, there can
be no question that they do rely on the amount as certified to.
20
The result reached in the Illinois case appears at first sight a severe
one. But if it is severe, it is nevertheless sound, for it faces section 62
squarely on the language in which the section is written; furthermore,
it makes for the usefulness and currency of negotiable paper, and gives
to holders for value something of the security that has been found to be
good policy as well as good law on the continent of Europe.2 ' Free
the mind for a moment from conceptions of justice built not on com-
mercial understanding, but on legal precedent, and it becomes difficult
to find objections to the rule which do not apply with equal force to any
doctrine of negotiability.
There is one rather startling implication in the rule which does not
seem to have been noticed by the court. Section 62 deals in express
terms only with the acceptor. But it is agreed on all hands that it
incorporates the rule of Price v. Nea 22 not only as to acceptors, but
by necessary implication as to drawees paying without prior accep-
drawer actually signed, will be conceded: suppose the drawing a forgery. The
question then becomes one simply of facing the language of the section, or of
straitiacketing that language into the older law.
' N. I. L. sec. 187. "Where a check is certified by the bank on which it is
drawn, the certification is equivalent to an acceptance."
" (1916) 171 App. Div. 195, ,57 N. Y. Supp. 316.
0 The objection may be made that the taker relies equally on the amount stated
in the check where it has been raised after the certification. This is true. But the
certifying bank escapes liability in that case not because of any want of policy in
the law to protect a bona fide taker, but because there is nothing in the chain of
causation to fix the certifying bank as the party to stand the loss. So, as to prior
parties, with any alteration after an instrument is put in circulation. N. I. L.
sec. 124. This section does not affect the principal case because it refers only to
"parties liable thereon" at the lime of alteration.
' Cf. Ames, op. cit. 4 HARv. L. Rtv. 306, 307. 2 Supra note 15.
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tance :23 "the greater includes the less," and rights foregone by agree-
ment to pay are not less foregone by payment. But if the same reason-
ing, by a logic which seems hard to escape, be applied to the same section
when payment is made on an altered check, without precedent certifica-
tion, the present law of quasi-contracts will be rudely shaken. Denial
of recovery by the bank which has so paid on an altered check was
probably not within the intent of the draftsmen of the N. I. L.; it does
seem to be carried, almost necessarily, in their language. The argument
from the necessity of finality, the best reason ever advanced to support
Price v. Neal, applies with full force here as well.2
4  That a rule similar
to that under consideration works well in practice in Europe
25 is abun-
dantly evidenced by the outcry now being made by European banks:
that all commercial transactions involving the purchase or collection by
them of dollar drafts drawn on Americans are hopelessly tangled and
unsettled by the possibility of the whole transaction being reopened
months after a supposed final settlement, on the unforeseeable discovery
of just such an alteration as is under discussion.
With the decision in the principal case (although a case of first
impression) definitely construing the section, with the force derived
from the principle of uniform interpretation of a uniform act, and with
the rulings already plentiful on the applicability to paying drawees of
the other aspect of this section on acceptors, it may fairly be expected





SCases collected Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law (3d ed. 1919) 225
et seq.; 12 A. L. R. lo89, 1114, note.
"4"The money of the commercial world is no longer coin. The exchanges of
commerce are nowv almost entirely by means of drafts and checks. It was largely
in deference to this fact that the recovery of money paid on paper of this kind,
to which the drawer's signature was forged, was made an exception to the general
rule as to the recovery of money paid under a mistake of fact. In view of the use
of this class of paper as money, it was considered that public policy required that,
as between the drawee and good-faith holders, the drawee bank should be deemed
the place of final settlement where all prior mistakes and forgeries should be
corrected and settled once for all, and, if not then corrected, payment should be
treated as final; that there must be a fixed and definite time and place to adjust
and end these things as to innocent holders; and that that time and place should be
the paying bank and the date of payment." Mitchell, J., in Gernunia Bank v.
Boutell (1895) 6o Minn. i89, 192, 62 N. W. 327, 328. See similar language in
First National Bank of Marshalltown v. Marshalltown State Bank (1899) 107
Iowa, 327, 77 N. W: IO45; Union Bank v. Dominion Bank (19o7, Ct App.) 17
Man. 68, 72.
'See also Ames, op. cit. 4 HARv. L. REv. 3o6; Uiion Bank v. Ontario Bk.
(I879, Super. Ct. Mont.) 23 L. C. Jurist, 66, citing pertinent language from
Pardessus and Pothier.
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WAIVER OF A PATIENT'S PRIVILEGE
The recent case of Hethier v. Johns (1921) 198 App. Div. 127, 189
N. Y. Supp. 605, is a good illustration of the evils attendant on the rule
empowering a patient to prevent his physician from testifying. It was
a personal injury action in which the plaintiff, as a witness, had fully
described her injuries and her feelings. She then called physicians
who had treated her to testify concerning her injuries. When the
defendant called still another physician, who had examined the plain-
tiff at a different time but in regard to the very same injuries, the
plaintiff objected to all questions concerning their professional relation-
ship on the ground that it was "privileged" by statute.
1 The Court
sustained this objection, holding that the plaintiff had not waived her
"privilege" either by her own testimony or by calling other physicians
to the stand.
In 1776 Lord Mansfield held, in The Duchess of Kingston's 
Trial,2
that a physician was under a duty to answer any questions propounded
to him in a court of justice concerning his professional relations with his
patients. This doctrine of the common law was accepted in America,
and exists in many states to-day.3 New York was the first to establish
the opposite rule by statute,4 and in spite of much hostile criticism,
5
'New York Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 834, now Civil Prac. Act, sec. 352.
It will be observed that the patient's "privilege" is in fact a power. The
patient is not the witness in these cases; and, indeed, if he is on the witness-stand
himself, he is not privileged to refuse to answer. Thus it is apparent that his
so-called "privilege" is very different from the privilege of a witness with respect
to self-incrimination. The latter is a true privilege, because the witness is per-
mitted to refuse to answer (he has no duty to answer; he is not commanded by
society to answer). The cases now under discussion are cases where the physician
is on the stand. The physician is certainly under no duty to the patient to refuse
to answer, and the patient has no right against him in such case. The physician
is not even privileged not to answer, at least in case the patient is represented in
court. But the patient has the power to create such a privilege in the physician
witness by making timely objections. It also becomes error for the court to
admit the testimony. With respect to this power the patient may adopt any one
of three courses of action: he may exercise it by objecting to the testimony, he
may sit silent and forbear to exercise it, or he may extinguish the power alto-
gether in the case by acts amounting to a "waiver."
2 (1776, H. L.) 2o How. St. Tr. 355, 573.
'Banigan v. Banigan (1904) 26 R. I. 454, 59 Atl. 313; Crow v. State (1921,
Tex. Cr. App.) 230 S. W. 148.
IN. Y. Rev. Sts. 1829, ch. 7, sec. 73.
"'As to the policy of the privilege, aid of extending it, there can only be con-
demnation. The chief classes of litigation in which it is invoked are actions on
policies of life insurance, where the deceased's misrepresentations as to health
are involved; actions for corporeal injuries, where the plaintiff's bodily condition
is to be ascertained; the testamentary actions, where the testator's mental condi-
tion is in issue. In all of these cases the medical testimony is the most vital and
reliable, the most important and decisive, and is absolutely needed for purposes
of learning the truth. In none of them is there any reason for the party to
conceal the facts except to perpetrate a fraud upon the opposing party, and in the
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more than half the states have enacted similar legislation. The rule is
restricted to a physician6 in his professional capacity,7 and does not
apply in the case of a third person who was present during the communi-
cation.8 When the physician is appointed by the court for the express
purpose of examining a patient, the professional relationship is said not
to exist.9 If, at the trial, the patient fails to call his physician, his
opponent is privileged to bring this fact to the attention of the jury,
pointing out that he might have done so if he had desired10 ; but no
inference can be drawn if the patient merely excludes the testimony
when the other party calls the physician to the stand."'
The patient's "privilege" rule confers a power on the patient 2 to
first two of these classes the advancement of fraudulent claims is notoriously
common. In none of these cases need there be any fear that the absence of the
privilege will subjectively hinder people from consulting physicians freely (which
is, as we have seen, the true reason for maintaining the privilege for clients of
attorneys); the injured person would still seek medical aid, the insured person
would still submit to a medical examination, and the dying testator would still
summon physicians to his cure. In litigation about wills, policies, and personal
injuries, the privilege, where it exists, is known in practice to be a serious
obstacle to the ascertainment of truth and a useful weapon for those interested in
suppressing it. Any extension of it to other jurisdictions is to be earnestly
deprecated." Greenleaf, Evidence (I6th. ed. 1899) 385.
See also Renian v. Dennin (1886) 103 N. Y. 573, 9 N. E. 320. In this case
it was admitted that the statutory rule excludes the most decisive evidence in
testamentary cases and actions upon policies, and furthermore that it "will work
considerable mischief."
'It does not apply in the case of a dentist, People v. De France (1895) 104
Mich. 563, 62 N. W. 709; a druggist, Brown v. Hannibal & St. Joseph Ry. (877)
66 Mo. 588; or a veterinary, Hendershott v. Western Union Telegraph Co.
(1898) io6 Iowa, 529, 76 N. W. 828.
The physician must be in attendance for the purpose of prescribing. Gray v.
City of New York (91o) 137 App. Div. 316, 122 N. Y. Supp. ii8. The rule is
not applicable if the communication was made after the professional relationship
was over: Arnold v. Ft. Dodge, D. M. & S. Ry. (1g91) 186 Iowa, 538, 173 N. W.
252; or if the examination of the patient was not professional: In re Freeman
(1887, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 46 Hun, 458; or if the examination was solely for the
purpose of obtaining information for testimony in a future suit: Shaughnessy v.
Holt (29o8) 236 II1. 485, 86 N. E. 256. It does not depend on whether or not the
services were gratuitous: It re Hallenberg's Guardianship (1919) 144 Minn. 39,
174 N. W. 443; or whether the patient was capable of choosing a physician:
Bauch v. Schultz" (igig, Sup. Ct) 109 Misc. 548, i8o N. Y. Supp. I88.
'Springer v. Byram (1894) 137 Ind. 15, 36 N. E. 361. If the third person is an
agent of the doctor the rule applies. North American UniMo v. Oleske (1917)
64 Ind. App. 435, 116 N. E. 68. It does not apply when it appears that the
communication was not intended to be confidential. In re Schwartz's Will (292o)
79 Okla. 191, 292 Pac. 203.
'Examination by such physician to determine the sanity of the patient. People
v. Austin (igio) I99 N. Y. 446, 93 N. E. 57. Or to determine the pregnancy of a
prosecutrix. State v. Winnett (907) 48 Wash. 93, 92 Pac. 9o4-
10 Cooley v. Foltz (2891) 85 Mich. 47, 48 N. W. 176.
Brackney v. Fogle (19O1) 156 Ind. 535, 6o N. E. 303.
The patient only can effectively object to the testimony of his physician. Davis
v. Elzey (1921, Miss.) 88 So. 63o; Angerstein v. Milwaukee Monument Co.
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prevent his physician from revealing the condition of the former's
health; and it is not confined to cases where the patient is one of the
parties to an action. 3  While alive, the patient alone can exercise the
power'" or waive s it; upon his death the troublesome question arises
in whom the "privilege" then rests. The courts are in almost irre-
concilable conflict, some maintaining that it survives the death of the
patient and cannot be waived by heir, executor, or administrator,"'
while others claim that it rests in the heir alone.17  Some courts, notably
those of Missouri' s and Iowa, 9 hold that in a will contest the physi-
ciai's evidence is admissible if introduced by either party. In a recent
case 21 in the District of Columbia the executors offering the will for
probate were held not to be the legal representatives of the testator,
so as to' fall within the Code provision which allowed the "legal repre-
sentatives of the patient" to waive the "privilege." Some states
permit this "privilege" to be waived only by the "personal representa-
tive"2' of the patient, and have held the executor to be such repre-
sentative. 2 2  In an action for wrongful death, involving the validity of a
release, the physician was held incompetent to testify as to the patient's
mental capacity at the time when the release was made.23 Whether or
not the beneficiary under an insurance policy can waive the "privilege"
is no better settled. A recent case' held flatly that the beneficiary
could not do so. An earlier case,25 however, came to the opposite con-
clusion. Infants may be patients, but they have no power of waiver
so as to prevent their objecting to the testimony of the physician.26  In
(2919) 169 Wis. 502, 173 N. W. 215; Arizona Eastern Ry. v. Matthews (2919)
2o Ariz. 282, 18o Pac. 259; Markham v. Hipke (2919) 16g Wis. 37, 7i N. W.
300; U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hood (1921, Miss.) 87 So. J15; McCarthy
v. McCarthy (1921, Wash.) 199 Pac. 733. For the breach of the duty of secrecy
by the physician, see COMMENTS (1921) 30 YALE LAW jouRNAL, 289.
"In the Matter of Mary A. Myer (19o6) 184 N. Y. 54, 76 N. E. 92o.
"Supra note 12.
'5 Angerstein v. Milwaukee Monment Co., supra note 22; Hirschberg v.
Southern Pacific Ry. (1929) i8o Calif. 774, 183 Pac. 141."McCaw v. Turner (1921, Miss.) 88 So. 705; Maine v. Maryland Casualty Co.
(1920) 172 Wis. 350, 278 N. W. 749. The patient's power thus appears to be
supplanted by a privilege in the physician not to testify.
" Flack v. Brewster (1920) 107 Kan. 63, 29o Pac. 616.10Spurr v. Spurr (292o, Mo.) 226 S. W. 35.
In re Swain's Estate (2929, Iowa) 174 N. W. 493.
"Hutchins v. Hutchins (929) 48 App. D. C. 495.
'This is the view favored by the text-writers. 4 Vigmore, Evidence (1905)
sec. 2391; Elliott, Evidence (904) sec. 634. See N. Y. C. C. P. see. 836, now
C. P. A. sec. 354.
2 Grieve v. Howard (1929) 54 Utah, 225, i8o Pac. 423.
"Poinsett Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Longio (1929) 139 Ark. 69, 213 S. W. 15.
21 Maine v. Maryland Casualty Co., supra note x6.
"National Annuity Assoc. v. McCall (1912) 103 Ark. 2O, 146 S. W. 125.
" Corey v. Bolton (I9OO, Sup. Ct.) 31 Misc. 138, 63 N. Y. Supp. 915.
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these cases the guardian of the infant has the power of waiver, unless
such a waiver would be prejudicial to the interests of his ward. There
is a provision in the New York Statutes27 that a patient's attorney can
execute a waiver by stipulation before the trial. When the statute did
not provide for an express method of waiver, the widow of the patient
has been held to have the power. 28  All of which indicates the generally
confused state of the subject.29
The legislatures that have enacted the statutory rule in favor of
patients have done so in the belief that persons might otherwise have
hesitation in communicating freely with their physicians for fear that
the details of their ailments and weaknesses may be laid before the gaze
of the public. It would seem, when the patient himself has testifidd to
the state of his health, that the underlying reason for applying such a
rule has vanished; but cou*rts have been almost unanimous in holding
that such testimony is not a waiver.30 Although irrational and illogi-
cal,31 the courts have departed from it only in cases involving malprac-
tice,3 2 when testimony by the plaintiff operates as a waiver both as to
the physician himself and to others called in consultation with him.
The statutes of some states, 33 however, expressly provide that if the
patient testifies, the evidence of his physician is admissible on the same
point.
When a physician is put upon the stand by a patient, the latter thereby
prevents effective objection to the testimony of other physicians who
"N. Y. C. C. P. sec. 836, now C. P. A. sec. 354.
"Groll v. Tower (3884) 85 Mo. 249.
'A waiver by the plaintiff before the trial is possible unless expressly prohibited
by statute. Knights of Pythias v. Meyer (905) x98 U. S. 508, 25 Sup. Ct 754;
Croineenes v. Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W. (1920) 205 Mo. App. 419, 224 S. W.
I5; Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W. v. Farmer (i918) ii6 Miss. 626, 77 So. 655;
Western Travellers' Accident Assoc. v. Munson (1905) 73 Neb. 858, 103 N. W.
688. Filing a physician's certificate as part of the proofs of death, pursuant to a
clause in an insurance policy, is not a waiver of the testimony of the physician,
but is a waiver as to the contents of the certificate. Hicks v. Metropolitan Life
Inssurance Co. (1916) 196 Mo. App. 162, go S. W. 66x.
"Bauch v. Schultz, supra note 7; Hirschberg v. Sp. Pacific Ry., supra note 15.
""Certainly it is a spectacle fit to increase the layman's traditional contempt for
the chicanery of the law, when a plaintiff describes at length to the jury and a
crowded court-room the details of his supposed ailment and then neatly suppresses
the available proof of his falsities by wielding a weapon nominally termed a
privilege. .... .The whole reason for the privilege is the patient's supposed
unwillingness that the ailment should be disclosed to the world at large; hence
the bringing of a suit in which the very declaration, and much more the proof,
discloses the ailment to the world at large, is of itself an indication that the
supposed repugnancy to disclosure does not exist .... In actions for personal
injury, the permission to claim the privilege is a burlesque upon logic and justice."
4 Wigmore, op. cit. sec. 2389.
"Capron v. Douglass (i9o8) 193 N. Y. I, 85 N. E. 827.
"Okla. Sts. 2893, sec. 335; Or. Ann. Code, 1892, secs. 712, 713; Mont C. C. P.
1895, sec. 3163; Ariz. Rev. Sts. i9oi, see. 2535; Phelps Dodge Corporation v.
Guerrero (1921, C. C. A. 9th) 273 Fed. 425.
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were present at the same consultation. 4 This is not the case, however,
as to other physicians who have examined the patient at a different time
for the same ailment.3 5 A technical, and perhaps unnecessary restric-
tion is being carried to an unwarranted extent, when a patient, allowed
to testify to his injuries and permitted to call a physician who goes into
great detail concerning them, is then, as a climax, empowered to exclude
the evidence of another physician who perhaps examined him on the
same day-for the purpose, forsooth, that his ailments will not be
exposed to the gaze of the public. How applicable are the words of
that eminent Missouri jurist 3 6:
"May one cry Secrecy! Secrecy! Professional Confidence! when
there is no secrecy and no professional confidence? As well cry, Peace!
Peace ! when there is no peace. Jeremiah 6:14, q. v."
Another illogical technicality is the restriction imposed upon the
physician in cases where the patient has already, at a prior trial, allowed
the testimony to be given.3 7  Missouri is perhaps alone in saying that
a waiver continues to be operative no matter how many trials may be
required.3 8  A waiver" once made, .however, for the purposes of that
trial generally extends over the entire professional conduct of the
physician.3 9
In an attempt to create and defend rights of privacy the American
legislatures and courts have entangled themselves in a forbidding mass
of restrictions. In England no such statute in favor of patients has ever
been enacted.4 0 It is hard to explain the existence of such decisions as
that reached in the principal case, when the court saved "the patient
from possible disclosure by his physician, which might result in his
embarrassment or disgrace," although full disclosure had .already been
"'The very purpose of the statute is to hide, as with a veil, the malady and
trouble for which the physician treated her, and what may have passed between
them in the confidential relationship of physician and patient. But when the veil
has been lifted by the patient, or with her consent, and the secrets of the sick-
chamber given to the world, what logic is there in saying that the patient can clog
the wheels of justice itself by closing the mouths of other physicians who know
the real facts.'" Michaels v. Harvey (1915, Mo.) 179 S. W. 735, 738. Contra,
Jones v. Caldwell (1911) 20 Idaho, 5, 116 Pac. i1O.
U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hood, supra note 12.
"Lamm, J., in Smart v. Kansas City (19o7) 208 Mo. 162, 208, 1O5 S. W. 7o9,
722.
"T Arizona Eastern Ry. v. Matthews, supra note 12; Metropolitan Life I1s. Co.
v. Fitzgerald (igig) 137 Ark. 366, 2o9 S. W. 77.
'State v. Long (1914) 257 Mo. 199, 165 S. W. 748.
'Morris v. N. Y. Ont. & West Ry. (1895) 148 N. Y. 88, 42 N. E. 410 (when
plaintiff testified that her physician gave her certain tablets in April, 19o7, this
was not a waiver as to a similar prescription in 19o5).
""A medical practitioner, when called as a witness, is bound, if asked, and
if the question is pressed and allowed, to disclose every communication however
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made at the trial.4 ' At the present time, probably no branch of the
law is more involved, illogical, or senseless, and more lacking in that
much to be desired attribute-certainty.
CAN AN UNRECOGNIZED GOVERNMENT SUE?
The awkward result reached by the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of New York in the case of Russian Socialist Federated Soviet
Republic v. Cibrario (1921) 191 N. Y. Supp. 543, denying the plaintiff
the privilege to sue for an accounting a defendant alleged to have
defrauded the plaintiff of moneys entrusted to him, on the ground that
the plaintiff government had not been recognized by the United States,
calls for an examination of the principles on which the case was decided.
The refusal of the court to extend the protection of the law to the funds
of the plaintiff appears the more startling in the light of the fact in the
record that the funds were brought to this country through the instru-
mentality of the United States Government. It appears that in 1918
the Soviet Government, through its Cinematographic Committee of the
Commisariat of Public Instruction paid over to the United States Com-
mercial Attach6 in Petrograd one million dollars, to be deposited in the
National City Bank of New York, to be drawn against, by the defendant
under an agreement between the plaintiff government and the defen-
dant, of which our Government was cognizant, to supply the Soviet
Government with films for educational purposes. It was alleged that
the defendant had misappropriated a portion of the funds in question,
and the Government thereupon brought an action for an accounting.
This action, in the form of an appeal by the defendant from an order
appointing a receiver, the court dismissed because the plaintiff govern-
ment had not been recognized by the United States Government, thus
denying all redress and in effect proclaiming the doctrine that the
numerous unrecognized governments whose representatives in Wash-
ington now seek the recognition of the United States are without judi-
cial protection for their funds or other property brought here.
The court proceeded on the theory that the power to sue depended on
recognition, for without recognition, it is argued, the court could not
know that the plaintiff was a government. This is believed to be erro-
neous in principle. While recognition is perhaps the best means of
evidencing the existence of a government, it does not create the govern-
ment nor is it the only means of evidence. Chief Justice Best in the
important case of Yrisarri v. Clement' expressly accepted other evi-
dence, such as public notoriety, to prove the existence of an unrecog-
nized State. It need hardly be said that a State or Government may
private and confidential, which has been made to him while attending a patient in
his professional character." 2o Hals. Laws Eng. 337.
4' If special disclosures have been made to the particular witness that are not
already in evidence, there may be some slight reason for excluding them. '
' (1826, C. P.) ii Moo. C. P. 308. At p. 314 he said: "The existence of unac-
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exist independently of recognition. It is then called de facto. The
principal difference between a general de facto and a de jure Govern-
ment is that the latter's existence is a matter of record by reason of its
recognition-though recognition expressly as a de facto government is
also possible-whereas the existence of the former must be proved by
other evidence.
There are innumerable cases in the American and English courts
according full validity to the acts of foreign de facto governments not
recognized by the political departments of the United States or British
Government. For example, the title derived through the requisitioning
of property by the military forces or civil authorities of a de facto
government is protected in the courts ;2 acts committed by its officers
are regarded as Acts of State and protect the officer from personal
liability ;3 it may, even though only a local and temporary and not a
general de facto government, collect taxes and customs duties and
thereby discharge a taxpayer from the duty of paying them again to a
succeeding de jure government ;4 it may validly dispose of the fruits of
the public domain,5 and if a general de facto government, of the public
domain itself. In practically every respect, and certainly as an owner
of property and a contractor, it is regarded on the same legal, though
not necessarily diplomatic, footing as a de jure government. It is of
course held to the duties of such a government, and assumes and trans-
mits all State obligations. It will hardly be doubted, for example, that
Mexico will be held responsible for any unlawful acts of the unrecog-
nized Huerta government.6
knowledged states must be proved by evidence that they are associations formed
for mutual defence, acknowledging no authority dehors their own government,
observing the rules of justice towards the subjects of other states, living generally
under their own laws, and maintaining their independence by their own force."
See also (1922) 38 L. QUART. REV. 9; Underhill v. Hernandez (1895, C. C. A.
2d) 65 Fed. 577. On the recognition of de facto governments, see Thomas Baty,
So Called "De Facto" Recognition, supra at p. 469.
2 O'Neill v. Central Leather Co. (1915) 87 N. J. L. 552, 94 Atl. 789; Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co. (1918) 246 U. S. 301, 38 Sup. Ct. 309; Ricaud v. American
Metal Co. (1918) 246 U. S. 304, 38 Sup. Ct. 312. The subsequent recognition of
the Carranza Government was really immaterial. See COIMENTS (1918) -27
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 812. See also Republic of Peru v. Dreyfus Bros. & Co.
(1886) L. R. 38 Ch. Div. 348. See also the recent case of Luther v. Sagor [1921,
C. A.] 3 K. B. 532; COMM%ENTS (1921) 31 YALE: LAW JOURNAL, 82.
'Underhill v. Hernandez (1895, C. C. A. 2d) 65 Fed. 577, affirmed (897) 168
U. S. 250, 18 Sup. Ct. 83; Ford v. Surget (1878) 97 U. S. 594; Freeland v.
Williams (1889) 131 U. S. 405, 9 Sup. Ct. 763. See also F. Larnaude, Les
Gouvernements de Fait (1921) 28 REv. GLN. DE DR. INT. PuB. 457, 471, et seq.
'United States v. Rice (18ig, U. S.) 4 Wheat 246; Mazatlan and Bliefields
Cases, i Moore, Digest of International Law (19o6) 49, et seq.; MacLeod v.
United States (1913) 229 U. S. 416, 429, 33 Sup. Ct 955, 959.
5 "Georgiana" and "Lizzie Thompson" (U. S.) v. Perut, Moore, International
Arbitrations (1898) 1595, 4785.
' See Borchard, Intertational Pecuniary Claims against Mexico (1917) 26 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 339.
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Yet it is undoubtedly true that recognition by the political department
of the Government is in many cases vital to establish the capacity of a
plaintiff government to sue in the courts. The important question to
determine is the character of the suit and the issue involved. Wlen
either of these is political in its nature, the court properly turns to the
executive for guidance as to the political status of the plaintiff govern-
ment,7  Thus the political status of given territory must be determined
by the political department of the Government;8 as also the indepen-
dence of a revolting colony or portion of a Government at peace with
the United States,9 whether arising under ihe neutrality laws
10 or the
statutes against piracy.' Particularly is this true where the new politi-
cal entity, whether new State or merely new Government, claims as the
legal owner State property formerly controlled by its predecessor. or
-opponent faction. Here the court must be particularly careful not to
differ with the executive in recognizing the political authority of a given
government to represent the State.12  But where the plaintiff de facto
government does not claim as the legal successor of a prior government
or as the legitimate government between two opposing factions, but as
the legal owner of property in its own right, it would seem that political
recognition is immaterial. If it can prove its existence as a de facto
government and a property owner and its title to the property claimed,
there seems to be no valid reason why it should not receive the aid of
the courts in the protection of its property. The statements frequently
found in the reports to the effect that a foreign government recognized
by the United States may sue in our courts3 by no means establish the
proposition that a government not so recognized may hot under any
"So, also, where the government is a defendant, recognition will by the rule of
comity serve to give immunity from the jurisdiction. See Arnold D. McNair,
Judicial Recognition of States and Governments, British Year Book of Interna-
tional Law (1921-22) 57 et seq.
'Jones v. United States (18go) 137 U. S. 202, I Sup. Ct. 80; Williamls v.
Suffolk Insurance Co. (1839, U. S.) 13 Pet. 415.
' United States v. Palmer (1818, U. S.) 3 Wheat. 61o. But see the illuminating
opinion of Johnson, Circuit Judge, in Consul of Spain v. The Conception (i8ig,
C. C. D. S. C.) Fed. Cas. No. 3137, 6 Fed. Cas. 359.
" The Hornet (187o, D. D. N. C.) Case No. 6705, 12 Fed. Cas. 529; U. S. v.
Trumbull (1891, S. D. Calif.) 48 Fed. 99, 104; Kennett v. Chambers (1852, U. S.)
14 How. 38.
' The Ambrose Light (1885, S. D. N. Y.) 25 Fed. 408.
'Republic of Mexico v. Arrangois (855, N. Y.) ii How. Pr. i; Rose v.
Himely (i8o8, U. S.) 4 Cranch, 241. This rule entirely justifies the decision in
City of Berne v. Bank of England (18o4, Ch.) 9 Ves. 347, and the decision of
judge Manton in Russian ocialist Federated Soviet Republic v. The Steamers
Penza and Tobolsk (1921, U. S. D. C. E. D. N. Y.) N. Y. L. JOuR., Oct. 4, 1921,
though the reasoning of the latter case does not seem entirely satisfactory.
"3Republic of Honduras v. Soto (1889) 112 N. Y. 310, 19 N. E. 845; Republic
of Mexico v. Arrangois (856, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 5 Duer, 634, 637; State of Yucatan
v. Arguinendo (1915, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 92 Misc. 547, 157 N. Y. Supp. 219.
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circumstances sue, a doctrine to which Judge Manton in the Steamers
Penza and Tobolsk case'4 and the Appellate Division in the instant case
appear to give unqualified support. If there was any political issue
involved in the present case it was whether the court could admit the
plaintiff as the de facto Government of. Russia when the political depart-
ment of this Government was still recognizing an Ambassador in Wash-
ington who represents a government which for over four years has
been nothing but a historical memory. Even this issue, it is believed,
was immaterial to the plaintiff's privilege to sue in this case.
E. M. B.
RECOVERING TAXES FROM A COMMISSIONER'S SUCCESSOR
What seems obvious justice is at times made strangely impossible by a
rigid construction of supposedly controlling legislation. An interesting
example may be found in the recent case of Smietanka v. Indiana Steel
Co. (1921) 42 Sup. Ct. I. The plaintiff sued to recover an internal
revenue tax which he paid under duress to X, a tax collector. The
defendant was X's successor. Acting under a statute,' the District Court
certified that there was probable cause that X had acted under the direc-
tion of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and that the amounts
recovered should therefore be paid from the Treasury. The Supreme
Court held, however, (two judges dissenting) that the action was
personal and did not lie against the successor in office.
Prior to the passage of later statutes, a tax collector was personally
liable for taxes collected through mistake or duress, if due protest was
made at the time of collection and notice given of an intention to sue.
Such liability was unquestioned where the money still remained in the
hands of the collector, but there was some conflict where the money had
been paid into the Treasury.2  The first step toward relieving collectors
of this personal liability was the passage of statutes requiring collectors
to pay the taxes collected into the Treasury and providing that on the
death of the collector all lists were to be transferred to his successor.'
It being the duty of the collector to collect the tax and pay it into the
Treasury, his acts, it seems, are clearly acts pertaining to his official
duties and any responsibility for those acts results from the office. The
collector, being a mere agency for collection under orders from superiors
" Supra note 12.
'Act of March 3, 1863 (12 Stat at L. 741).
*That there was liability in any event: Elliott v. Swartwout (1836, U. S.) io
Pet. 137; see Anzson v. Murphy (1883) 109 U. S. 238, 3 Sup. Ct. 184. That
there is conflict where the money has been paid into the Treasury: Lindsey v. Allen
(1897) 19 R. I. 721, 36 Atl. 84o; Brown v. Pontchartrain Land Co. (1897) 49 La.
Ann. 1779, 23 So. 292; Scottish Union & N. Ins. Co. v. Herriott (1899) iog Iowa,
6o6, 8o N. W. 665.
'Act of June 30, 1864 (13 Stat. at L. 229) ; Act of June 30, 1864 (13 Stat. at
L. 238, 239); Cary v. Curtis (1842, U. S.) 3 How. 236.
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who have in fact assessed the tax, is in no way connected with the trans-
action in his personal capacity, and the rule would be a harsh one that
would inflict personal liability for what in most cases is a proper per-
formance of a delegated duty.4 By a statute of 1866, the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue is authorized to pay any judgment rendered against
a collector.5 This statute has been held to apply whether a certificate
of probable cause was issued or refused and it seems to have been
entirely overlooked in the instant case.6 It was further provided that an
action commenced against a collector shall not abate by reason of his
death or the expiration of his term of office, but shall survive against his
successor.7 This statute shows a clear intention that the liability of a
collector should attach to the office and not to the individual occupying
the office and, it is submitted, should have been construed to apply to the
instant case. The fact that the action was not commenced against the
predecessor ought not to be controlling. For example a recovery has
been allowed against the executors of a collector who died after the
action against him was commenced." It would be unwarranted to deny
a recovery against the executors on the ground that the action had not
been commenced during the lifetime of the deceased; for certainly, if
there was such a cause of action against the deceased as could survive
against his executors, the latter ought to be liable even if the action had
never been commenced. against the deceased.
The conclusiofi reached in the instant case was plainly the result of a
literal construction of a statute,9 which might very reasonably have been
construed so as to reach a more just decision. The words "by him"
may very fairly be construed to mean, by a collector in his official and
not in his personal capacity. The test in such cases might well be
as follows: if an action would have existed against the predecessor in
office as a result of a proper performance of his official duties, the action
ought to be permitted 'against his successor, for in such a case, the
certificate provided for by statute would unquestionably be given and
the judgment paid out of the Treasury; but where the predecessor
acted outside his official duties or against the orders of his superiors, the
certificate would clearly be withheld, and there it would plainly be just
to consider the action a purely personal one which would not survive
against the successor. There would then be no danger of a successor's
having ever to suffer for the wrongful collection of a tax by his prede-
'Armour v. Roberts (19o7, C. C. W. D. Mo.) 151 Fed. 846; Erskine v. Hohn-
bach (1871, U. S.) 14 Wall. 613.
'Act of July 13, 1866 (14 Stat. at L. iii).
'United States v. Frerichs (1888) 124 U. S. 315, 8 Sup. Ct. 514.
'Act of Feb. 8, 1899 (30 Stat. at L. 822).
'Patton v. Brady (1902) 184 U. S. 6o8, 22 Sup. Ct. 493. This case, often cited
to show that the action against a collector is purely personal, cannot be relied upon
too strongly since it fails to consider the statute in note 7 supra.
'Act of March 3, 1863 (12 Stat. at L. 741).
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cessor without being reimbursed by the Commissioner. Some courts
recognize, in a case of this kind, that an action lies either against the
predecessor, who collected the tax, or against the United States, but
not against the successor.10 To say that an action lies against the
United States and in the same breath to say that an action cannot on any
theory be brought against the succeeding collector is plainly inconsistent.
THE BLACKLIST AND SECONDARY BOYCOTT AS AN AID TO PRICE-FIXING
The recent English case of Ware v. Motor Trade Assoc. (I92I,
A. C.) 125 L. T. R. 265, directs attention to a branch of the law that is
much under discussion at the present time. The defendant association,
composed of a majority of the manufacturers and merchants engaged in
the motor trade, established a uniform price list. The plaintiff dealer,
who was not a member of this association, and acting on behalf of a
customer, sold an automobile at a price above that fixed by the associa-
tion. Upon the refusal of the plaintiff to pay a fine, and apologize, the
defendants placed his name on a stop list, thereby signifying that they
would refuse to deal with the plaintiff or with anyone that dealt with
him. The plaintiff sought an injunction, which was refused. If the
decision may be accepted as a true interpretation of the present English
law, it will be of benefit to those who are undecided as to the effect of
the two leading cases of Allen v. Flood- and Quinn v. Leathern,2 which
are professedly applied in the instant case.
Since the situation presented was essentially that involved in labor
disputes, the court seized upon that analogy. There is thus afforded an
opportunity of applying the analysis suggested in previous comments on
labor law.3
In following this analysis, the first thing to be determined is whether
there was a justifiable object. To state it in simple terms-If B
threatens to refuse to deal with C unless C refuses to deal with A, thus
bringing economic coercion to bear on A, is it sufficient justification
that B wishes to maintain an organization to keep prices uniform? The
court had no difficulty in holding this to be a justifiable object in accord
with the English rules.4  In America, under the Sherman Act or state
United States v. Emery (1915) 237 U. S. 28, 35 Sup. Ct. 499.
[1898, H. L.] A. C. i.
' [i9oi, H. L.] A. C. 495.
'COMMENTS (192) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 280, 404, 5o1. It was suggested
that essentially there is but little difference, if any, between a strike and a boycott
and that the same general rules should apply in both cases.
'It is submitted, that this point was more or less taken for granted. Certainly
there was but little reference to authority. It was stated on p. 271 that the rule
established in the Mogul case (Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor f1892, H. L.]
A. C. 25) was at no time dissented from in the House of Lords and was "that it
is no part of the duty of the court to inquire whether the action of the defendants
in that case was either selfish or unreasonable, but that it was sufficient if it
appeared to have been taken bona fide in their own interest in the exercise of their
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anti-trust acts, the contrary would be true.5 For the purpose of com-
parison with the American cases, however, it will be assumed that the
object would have been justifiable in this country.
The object being justifiable, there remains the question whether the
means used were legal." To put it into simple terms-may B use
economic pressure on a third person C in order to have C bring economic
pressure on A to compel A to accede to B's demand? This was the
main point involved in the instant case and the court had difficulty in
sustaining its decision that such means were permissible. Three judges
gave their decisions; the outstanding points were: (i) legal means are
determined by justification; (2) B was privileged to threaten to do that
which he was privileged to do; and (3) a rejection of the prima facie
tort idea.
If means are to be determined by justification, we are applying the
same yardstick that is used to determine whether the object was lawful.7
Therefore, in deciding the one, the other is also settled. A careful
analysis of this question will show that there is a sharp line between the
two, and that it is the object, not the means that is determined by justi-
fication. Custom and public policy outline the scope of decisions
defining permissible methods.8
trade." Another justice states, on p. 276, that "it is in their (association) opinion
in the interests of their trade that their members' goods should be distributed at
their members' fixed prices, no more and no less. That. this is a lawful object I
have no doubt." The court is doubtless right in holding this to be a justifiable
object, since there seems to be a wide latitude in England on the question of price
fixing. Elliman Co. v. Carrbtgton [Tgoil 2 Ch. 275. Yet it seems well to point
out that the test is not whether the defendants think it is in the protection of their
trade interests, but whether society chooses to so regard it. Salmond, Torts (5th
ed. 1920) 530; North Western Salt Co. v. Electrolytic Co. [1914, H. L.] A. C. 461.
That the object is justifiable is well illustrated by the case of National Phono-
graph Co. v. Edison-Bell Co. [19o8] i Ch. 335, ii which the facts are similar to
the present case, with the added fact that A obtained the goods by representing
that he was not blacklisted. B sued A and obtained a judgment because A had
obtained the goods by such misrepresentation. Obviously the court was protecting
an association which fixed prices.
'Boston Store v. Graphaphone Co. (1918) 246 U. S. 8, 38 Sup. Ct. 257; Victor
Co. v. Kemeny (1921, C. C. A. 3d) 271 Fed. 81o; Martell v. White (19o4) 185
Mass. 255, 69 N. E. io85. But see Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis (1893) 54 Minn. 223,
55 N. W. iii.
'This is the method of attack that is generally followed, as explained in
COMMENTS, supra note 3. The court stated on p. 271, "the material question must
be whether, if the end sought to be attained is lawful, the means are in themselves
unlawful."
" "What the defendants did, and what is complained of in the present action, was
done by them bona fide in protection of their trade interests. Under these circum-
stances neither such coercion or threats as were used, nor the acting by the defen-
dants in combination, render their action, in my opinion, unlawful or actionable."
Bankes, L. J., at p. 271.
'When B's refusal to deal with C, unless C refrains from dealing with A,
results in C's withdrawal of trade from A, and A sues B, the object is what B is
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Many of the older cases labored to show that a person is privileged to
threaten to do that which he is privileged to do. There is little opposi-
tion to this doctrine at the present time. In the instant case, however,
it is necessary to show that B was privileged to refuse to deal with C
unless C refused to deal with A (as well as threaten to do so) a point
practically assumedY
The remaining element of importance was a disapproval of the prima
trying to accomplish by having A do as B demands. Here, B's object is to keep
prices fixed. The means used is a secondary boycott; B, through C, is injuring
A. If C sues B, however, the object is the same as before, but the means, as to C,
is simply a primary boycott. Thus, in this country, in the first case A would have
a remedy because the object and the means are both unlawful. In the second case,
only the object would be unlawful. And so, if we assume the object to be lawful
(as the English court held), A would have a remedy, but not C. This is perhaps
unjust, for the defendant's conduct is the -same; but it has not received much
attention in our law. See, however, Lehigh Structural Steel Co. v. Atlantic Works
(192o, N. J. Eq.) iii At. 376. It is thus seen that the means have been grad-
ually listed, as custom has dictated, and then do not change with each case through
any method of justification. It includes such things as force, injury to property,
picketing, etc. The secondary boycott has also been placed on this list. Thus in
the first case B used a secondary boycott against A and the means used was illegal.
In the second case, B used no secondary boycott against C and the means used was
legal.
"Just as 'fraud' cannot be fully defined, so 'unlawful means' is insusceptible
of exhaustive definition. But the existing decisions indicate certain acts and
conduct which fall within the phrase. Other manifestations of conduct may in
future days be also held to fall within it. Personal violence against a third person
in order to injure a plaintiff; or threats of personal violence; or nuisance; or
fraud; or threats, even though they do not amount to threats of personal violence;
are recognized heads of unlawful means." Pratt v. British Medical Assoc. [igig]
i K. B. 244, 260.
'The only support for this point was the case of Scottish Co-operative Society
v. Glasgow Fleshers' Assoc. (1898, Sc. 0. H.) 35 Sc. L. Rep. 645, where a com-
bination of butchers informed auctioneers that no butcher would buy from them
if the auctioneers sold to the co-operative stores, this course being taken to protect
the interest of the butchers by driving their competitors, the co-operative stores,
out of business. When put in plain terms it is that B tells C that C must sell
either to B or to A. (If compared with the labor cases, it would be called a
primary dispute, i. e. one concerned directly with conditions of employment.) In
the instant case, B tells A that he must perform certain acts, and when he fails to
follow directions, tells C (an outsider) that he must cease dealing with A. In
the first instance, B's dispute is primarily with C; in the second instance his dispute
is solely with A. That is the reason that the court is unable to harmonize the
Glasgow case with Quinn v. Leathem, spra note 2. See also White v. Riley
(1920, C. A.) 89 L. J. Ch. 628 which approved of Hodges v. Webb [1920] 2 Ch.
7o, overruled Valentine v. Hyde [I919] 2 Ch. 129, and applied Allen v. Flood,
supra note i. It is to be noted that in support of this theory the court goes even
further and would disapprove of the generally accepted theory that a person has a
beneficial liability in trade. It is not that a person "has a right to trade, and there-
fore every one must trade with him, and refusal to do so is an unlawful act; and
no one may compete with him, and injurious competition is a wrongful act, because
it injures him in his trade." Scrutton, L. J., at p. 273. But see Pratt v. British
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facie tort idea.10 While this view may be salutary, the historical growth
of this branch of the law has certainly established the doctrine. It is,
moreover, a theory that has been given particular attention and approval
in the English cases."- Even if we reject the prima facie tort idea,
however, the court has failed to furnish a satisfactory reason for
holding that a secondary boycott is a legal method.
Upon examination of the English cases, it seems that, unless the
facts of the instant case fall within the Trades Dispute Act12 (which
the court fails to mention), the means used should have been considered
unjustifiable.' 3 The present decision would be anomalous in America,
as it presents the case of a secondary boycott, which is permitted in only
a few states.
If a secondary boycott is to be permitted, it is far better that it be
openly recognized as such, than that its true character be veiled by
circuitous reasoning. Its legality may-be coming in America. If so,
it is to be hoped that the courts will be frank enough to admit that the
past decisions were unjust, and that public policy has required the
change.
THE OFFER OF PROOF IN GROUNDING EXCEPTIONS
Many attorneys apparently assume that omniscience is inherent in
appellate courts. In appealing a case they present a record of the trial
court which is fundamentally deficient in failing to place the errors
assigned, fairly before the court of appeals. This is due either to the
Medical Assoc., su-pra note 8, at p. 258 et seq., as supporting the opposite view,
advanced in CommENTs (1921) 30 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 230.
0 "Such co-existing rights do in a world of competition necessarily impinge
upon one another, and it appears to me illogical to start with the assumption that
an interruption of the power of a man to do as he pleases within the law is prima
facie a legal wrong, which in every case needs to be justified. The true question
is, was the power interrupted by an act which the law deems wrongful? with the
practical result that to determine liability one has to concentrate, not upon the
effect on the plaintiff, but upon the quality of the act of the defendant." Atkin,
L. J., at p. 276.
" The instant case is the first case of importance to uphold this doctrine since it
was brought into prominence in the case of Allen v. Flood, supra: note i. On the
other side, there is a line of important cases upholding the prima facie tort idea.
This started with the case of Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor (1889, C. A.)
L. R. 23 Q. B. Div. 598, and was approved by Quinn v. Leathemr, supra note 2, at
pp. 525, 527. Giblan v. Nat'l Amalgamated Union [1903] 2 K. B. 6oo, 625;
Attorney-General v. Adelaide Co. (1913, P. C.) io9 L. T. R. 258.'
" (19o6) 6 Edw. VII, c. 47.
"It is difficult to reconcile the instant case with that of Larkhin v. Long [1915,
H. L.] A. C. 814, where the plaintiff was given a remedy under circumstances
not as strong as those of the instant case. Where the Trades Dispute Act, supra
note 12, does not apply (i. e. acts done not in contemplation of furtherance of a
trade dispute within the meaning of the act) it seems that the common-law rules
should govern and in the instant case the means would be illegal.
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tardy diligence of an earnest search through the record for flaws after
the trial is over or else to a careless omission of an offer of proof as the
basis of error when they know that the lower court's refusal to hear
their witness is erroneous. The offer of proof, necessary to perfect a
record, varies in procedure and inclusiveness in different jurisdictions.
The majority of courts, however, require the more formal procedure.
1
Under their practice it is necessary actually to call a witness to the stand
and a mere conversation between the court and counsel is not a suf-
ficient offer of evidence. 2  This rule assures a strict guaranty of good
faith and fairness by the proponent of the evidence. The Federal
Courts on the other hand assume good faith and require the presenta-
tion of a witness only where there are indications of bad faith.
3  The
advantages of thus dispensing with the use of a witness are said to be
the saving of time and the placing of the issues of law more decisively
before the court.4  It carries with it, however, a possibility of the court
being deceived by unscrupulous counsel who may in fact be unable to
produce the proof offered.
To constitute prejudicial error in excluding the answer of a witness
on the stand, the question must be both proper in form and pertinent to
the matter at issue. An appellate court will not grant a new trial for
an erroneous ruling based on one of these grounds, if the evidence
would be inadmissible bn the other.
Where an objection to a proper question has been sustained, to save-
an error in the record, counsel must of course take an exception. The
rules followed in the various jurisdictions differ as to whether or not it
is incumbent on him to proceed further. According to the orthodox
view no error will be predicated unless the proponent of the evidence
follows his exception with a statement of the answer he expected.
5
'Chicago City Ry. v. Carroll (1903) 206 Ill. 318, 68 N. E. 1087; .uby v. Crad-
dock (1919) 56 Mont 556, i85 Pac. 771; i Thompson Trials (2d ed. 1912) sec.
685.
Where a proper offer of proof is made with one witness, the proponent need
not call others to lay the basis for his exception to the exclusion of further
evidence necessary for his case. Bartholow v. Davies (1916) 276 Ill. 505, 114
N. E. 1017.
'Cf. Chicago City Ry. v. Carroll, supra note i.
"Scotland County v. Hill (1884) 112 U. S. 183, 5 Sup. Ct 93; Mo. Pac. Ry. v.
Castle (igog, C. C. A. 8th) 172 Fed. 841; Platte Valley Cattle Co. v. Bosserman-
Gates, etc. Co. (1912 C. C. A. 8th) 2o2 Fed. 692. Wisconsin does not require the
calling of a witness. Witt v. Voigt (I916) 162 Wis. 568, I56 N. W. 954.
' Cf. Scotland County v. Hill and Platte Valley Co. v. Bosserman-Gates, etc. Co.,
supra note 3.
'McKee v. Hurst & Co. (1918) 21 Ga. App. 571, 94 S. E. 886; Arfsturm v.
Baker (1919, Mo.) 214 S. W. 859; Pittsburg etc. Ry. v. Retz (I919, Ind. App.)
325 N. E. 424; Louisville, etc. Ry. v. Abercrombie (r919) 17 Ala. App. 233, 84 So.
423; Stilz v. Ketelsen (i92o, Ind. App.) 129 N. E. 3I; Seals, etc. Co. v. Bell
(920) I7 Ala. App. 331, 84 So. 779; Bringhurst v. Bringhurst (i92o, Mo. App.)
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This then becomes part of the record. An appellate court may thus
judge whether or not the appellant has been prejudiced by the exclu-
sion of the evidence.6 If testimony has been wrongfully excluded as
incompetent, the granting of a new trial would indeed be vain if the
evidence proved irrelevant or immaterial.7  The orthodox rule safe-
guards an appellee from the intentional protraction of litigation by an
appellant seeking to defeat the ends of justice. The federal rule, on
the contrary, requires no such offer of the expected evidence. A party
is deemed to have been harmed by an adverse ruling where his ques-
tion was proper in form and relevant to the issue and would have
admitted of an answer favorable to him." A dispensation with a
demonstration of purpose by counsel is alleged to have two advantages.
It does away with repeated offers of proof as the trial progresses; it
guards against the possibility that the statements to the court will fur-
nish the witness a key to a realization of the exact testimony needed.9
If one more formality, added to those incident to receiving evidence, is
an inconvenience, it is certainly not as great as the difficulties inherent
in the weary route of a new trial reaching the same end unaffected by the
evidence that had previously been excluded. The second argument in
support of the federal rule asserts the danger that the witness will be
prompted. This is more apparent than real. No injustice has been
done if the testimony is true. If a falsehood, the opposing party has
his opportunities of cross-examination and impeachment. But all
objections could be obviated by requiring the incorporation in the
record of the answer of the witness. To prevent the possible prejudice
of the jury, the jurors could retire as when a witness is examined on
his voir dire.10 '
Certain circumstances, however, render an offer of proof unneces-
sary. Where a trial court regards the theory of the proponent as
futile, the court's ruling strikes at the heart of his case and he need
make no offer of. proof."1 This is a situation where the court and not
counsel is at fault. In the recent case of Gutt v. Walter's Estate (1921,
222 S. W. 874; Janson v. Pac. Diking Co. (1920) 97 Or. i29, 19o Pac. 340;
Davis v. Union Meeting House Soc. (1920) 93 Vt. 520, io8 Ati. 704; Reeves v.
Redmwnd (1921, Vt.) 113 At. 711, 3 C. J. 825.
'AshIMun v. Nichols (1919) 92 Or. 223, 18o Pac. 51o.
SCf. Powell v. Union Pac. Ry. (1914) 255 Mo. 42o, 446, 164 S. W. 628, 636.
'Buckstaff v. Russell (1894) 151 U. S. 626, 14 Sup. Ct. 448; Himrod v. Ft. Pitt
Minding Co. (1912, C. C. A. 8th) 202 Fed. 724. Where the exclusion of a deposi-
tion is assigned as error, the federal courts require in the record a demonstration of
what the testimony would be. Packet Co. v. Clough (1874, U. S.) 20 Wall. 528.
This is due to a rule of court. Rules of the Suprene Court (1884) no. 21, sec. 2
(2).
'Cf. Buckstaff v. Russell, supra note 8.
" Cf. Cincinnati, etc. Ry. v. Stonecipher (1895) 95 Tenn. 311, 32 S. W. 208;
Griffin v. Henderson (1903) 117 Ga. 382, 43 S. E. 712.
. 1Brundage v. Mellon (1895) 5 N. D. 72, 63 N. W. 209.
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Mich.) 184 N. W. 529, a trial judge was similarly to blame for the
indefinite condition of the record, as he had prevented counsel from mak-
ing a formal offer. Quite properly a new trial was granted. While the
appellate court may penalize a party for his counsel's carelessness, it
should give him the benefit of any doubt that is the result of the trial
court's confidence in its own infallibility.
The more common exception where an attorney need not proceed
with an explanation of his purpose is one taken when his question on
cross-examination is held improper.1 2 This is obviously correct. An
offer of the expected answer would be merely speculative. It would
allow unscrupulous attorneys to deal unfairly with the court. It would
put the witness on his guard destroying the whole purpose of cross-
examination.
Most of the work of appellate tribunals should be done by counsel
and judge in the trial court.
When is a "legal highway" not a highway? When there is not a
clear and unobstructed path to the heavens. That, in effect, seems to
be the doctrine laid down in Town of Exeter v. Meras (1921, N. H.)
114 Atl. 24. The Town of Exeter claimed a right in a highway by
user for more than the twenty-year period prescribed by statute." Dur-
ing this period, a bay window projected from the second story of the
defendant's house above the claimed highway. The defendant was
the original owner of the land in question. He commenced to extend
the bay window down to the ground, and the Town of Exeter petitioned
for an injunction to restrain him, as such an extension would incumber
the highway. The bill was dismissed on the ground that a "legal high-
way" included not only the soil, but also all the space above it, and the
partial occupancy of this space by a bay window during the prescriptive
period constituted a continuous assertion of a right inconsistent with
that of the public in the highway. Reduced to its simplest terms, this
amounts to saying that in no case can a "legal highway" come into
existence where there has been some occupation of a portion of the
space above, however slight.2 An extraordinary proposition! Can
"Knapp v. Wing (1900) 72 Vt. 334, 47 Atl. 1075; Cunningham v. Austin, etc.
Ry. (1895) 88 Tex. 534, 31 S. W. 629; Budd v. Northern Pac. Ry. (1921) 59
Mont. 238, 195 Pac. 11o9; but see contra, Reynolds & Heitsinan v. Henry (1921,
Iowa) 185 N. W. 67.
'IN. H. Pub. Sts. igoi, ch. 67, sec. i.
'The Court, however, suggests a distinction between a "legal highway" and a
right of travel differing from and less than a "legkl highway." Such a distinc-
tion does not seem to be borne out by the authorities. It is quite probable that the
Court, in making this distinction, is influenced in great measure by the fact that
New Hampshire is one of the few states in which a right of way by immemorial
user or custom may be acquired. Kitowles v. Dow (1851) 22 N. H. 387.
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one, by maintaining a flag-pole, for example, over a claimed highway
by prescription, later defeat the right of the public to use such a high-
way by extending the pole in a solid mass to the ground? Many public
highways run underneath covered arches or connecting bridges such as
join factory buildings on opposite sides of the street. To permit such
highways to be effectually destroyed by allowing an owner to so extend
an arch or bridge to the ground with impunity would clearly hamper
and endanger public travel. Though the Court in the instant case deals
with the problem as one involving a prescriptive right acquired by user,
as was justified by a statute,3 it appears to be but a simple case of a
dedication to the public. The question raised really involves the limit
or extent of a highway dedicated to the public. From the nature of
the case, to define the boundaries of a highway so dedicated is quite
impossible. The authorities are agreed, however, that the extent of a
dedication is, as a general rule, co-extensive with the actual use by the
public.4 If, therefore, in the principal case, such use extended as a
matter of fact to the portion of the highway under the bay window, it
would seem that such a right was acquired by the public for purposes of
public travel as could not be interfered with by the defendant. To
recognize such a right in the public would not at all be recognizing a
further right to have the window removed as originally maintained, a
proposition plainly implied by the court. Such a conclusion is clearly
a non-sequitur if we apply the general rule, for the public use did not
extend to the space occupied by the window.
'Supra note i.
'Donovan v. Union Pac. Ry. (192o) 104 Neb. 364, 177 N. W. 159; Thiessen v.
City of Lewiston (1914) 26 Idaho, 505, 144 Pac. 548; Angell, Highways (3d ed.
1886) sec. 155. Where, however, there has been an express dedication defining the
boundaries of the highway, the fact that the public confined its use to a narrow
portion does not affect its right to use the entire width. Brunner Fire Co. v.
Payne (9o9) 54 Tex. Civ. App. 5oI 118 S. W. 6o2.
